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William T. Allen, Blue Ribbon Committee on Audit Committee Practices

Remarks Before the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Audit Committee Practices
December 9, 1998

William T. Allen
Director, NYU Center for Law & Business
Professor of Business & Professor of Law, New York University.
Chairman. Independence Standards Board
Of counsel, Wachtell, Lipton. Rosen & Katz
Thank you for the invitation to address this Blue Ribbon Committee. I hope I can
contribute something to your deliberations and to the success of your important
mission. I commend Chairman Arthur Levitt and the business leaders who are
dedicating their attention to the important corporate governance subject of audit
committee standards and practices.
I speak today to you in a number of capacities, each of which converges on
today's topic. First, I speak as one with an academic interest in corporate
governance. I am a Professor of Business in the Department of Finance and a
Professor of Law at New York University and director of the NYU Center for Law
& Business. In this capacity I am greatly interested in increasing our
understanding and facilitating innovation in forms and practices of efficient
management and governance. Such knowledge will permit greater productivity of
our economy, which in turn would afford us a greater capacity to relieve human
suffering and enhance human welfare.
Second, I speak to you also as the Chairman of the Independence Standards
Board, the independent private sector board established jointly by the SEC and
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to establish independence
standards for public auditors. In this capacity I am especially concerned that
auditors continue to perform their valuable service to our capital markets without
being affected by economic or other interests that would cast a shadow upon
their independence and thus the reliability of their attestation.
Finally I speak as a lawyer, counsel to a leading corporate law firm and former
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. In these roles I am concerned that
in establishing corporate governance norms we exercise balanced informed
judgment and do not create dysfunctional demands on those experienced men
and women who accept an invitation to undertake the weighty responsibility of
board and audit committee service.
I see each of these roles and goals as being entirely consistent with respect to
the functioning of corporate boards in their audit oversight function. After a few
background comments I will limit my remarks to a single aspect of audit
committee functioning.
I.

Corporate governance is not a term that one very often encountered fifteen years
ago. Then for the large publicly traded firm, "governance" was not much of an
issue. In the conventional wisdom of the period corporate boards were inevitably
and optimally passive advisory bodies. Things have changed remarkably over the
last 15 years. Complete passivity on boards is no longer seen as optimal. Today
it is more likely to be interpreted as pathological, in a strong form or weak one.
The forces at work in this transformation have been powerful and in some cases
elemental: technological innovation and political evolution contribute to the
creation of global markets that are brutally competitive; technological and
demographic changes have lead to evolution of powerful investor voices in ever
larger aggregations of savings, especially in mutual funds and pension funds.
Finally, to a lesser extent, law has contributed to the transformation in corporate
governance: courts have threatened directors with liability (while very rarely
imposing it) and the SEC has notably reduced the costs associated with
communication and coordination among institutional investors.
Today we no longer regard corporate boards as merely ornamental features of
the business and economic landscape. Instead they have become an important
focus of those investors, scholars, and regulators who seek moderate institutional
change to improve productivity. Journalists and thus the public appear too to
expect more of corporate directors today than in the past. Board members are
increasingly urged to find a productive role as intermediaries between the expert
senior management and the diverse and less well informed body of investors.
Today boards of public companies --- smaller, comprised of individuals who
themselves are committed to fewer boards on average and are more engaged -appear to be responding to these changed expectations. Increasingly they are
functioning more actively in their institutional role as informed intermediaries
between senior management and a diverse body of investors.
II.
I approach the subject of corporate boards with a strongly held view from my
years as a corporate law judge. That belief is that when we encounter what, in
retrospect, we conclude is poor board performance, it is rarely because the
individuals involved understood their duty in the circumstances but chose for
reason of gain or social ease to breach that duty. That sort of human weakness is
of course present, but it does not account for most cases in which in retrospect
we find sub-par board performance. Rather, I suggest that those instances of
board under-performance we observe from time to time result principally from a
failure of the various constituencies interested in good corporate governance to
agree on what constitutes right conduct for a board member in particular
circumstances.I believe, and I hope your experience leads you also to the
conclusion that the vast preponderance of corporate directors want to do the right
thing, but in moments of crisis and in even moments before a crisis, it is
sometimes rather unclear what specific actions duty requires. Thus corporate
directors can be assisted in their work by guidance respecting the nature and
scope of their duty in various contexts from authoritative institutions: from courts
in decided cases, from the SEC in enforcement actions, in no action letters and in
rules and regulations; from Self Regulatory Organizations, such as the NYSE and
NASDAQ in a variety of ways and from responsible professional organizations
such as the Business Roundtable or NACD in establishing principles of good
practice. Such guidance need not be couched in mandatory terms and should not
deprive those on the firing line of flexibility in their considered actions. Progress
generally does not lie in the direction of fixed mandatory business governance
structures; there should be no single template for good corporate governance

structures. But such guidance will help to establish common expectations of the
role of director or, in this instance, of audit committee member. Thus I see this
committee's task as potentially highly beneficial.
Let me then turn specifically to audit committees. While our system has generally
wisely avoided mandatory governance features, the notable counterexamples are
vitally important. For example, every corporation must have a board that is
replaceable through investor election either in whole annually or in staggered
terms. Fundamental transactions -- merger, dissolution, charter amendment, sale
of all assets - must be approved by shareholder vote. For Delaware chartered
companies shareholders must retain the power to enact bylaws. Among these
few mandatory governance provisions is the requirement, for issuers with publicly
traded securities, that the board has an audit committee comprised either or by a
majority of independent directors. This requirement was wisely and appropriately
imposed first by the New York Stock Exchange and later by the NASDAQ. Many
practical questions face a board when first establishing its audit committee or
when periodically reviewing its board structure. What is the specific scope of audit
committee responsibilities?Do they, for example, extend beyond financial audit to
include review of the corporation's risk and legal compliance programs? Should
the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities be set forth in a written charter
for clarity? What skills are needed for effective service on the committee? What
direct access should audit committee members have to firm officers or
employees? What professional assistance ought the committee be authorized to
retain? How extensive should the audit committee's role be in the auditor
retention and at what stage? What sort of communication channel should the
committee have with internal and external auditors? And finally, can the financial
and risk monitoring function be carried out effectively by the audit committee
without creating unreasonable burdens considering the nature of the commitment
that a director is expected to make in assuming office? These are some of the
questions to which I hope this committee is able to offer guidance.
Let me narrow my subject to the single aspect of the audit committee work: its
role in selection of the corporation's outside independent auditor and specifically
its role in assuring that in its opinion the auditing firm and its relevant personnel
are independent of the company, its affiliates and officers. On this subject, as with
others, I speak today for myself only and not for the ISB as an institution. The
Independence Standards Board has not met and deliberated with respect to your
recent invitation for comment.
III.
Generally our law and our business practices reflect the embedded belief that the
requirement that a judgment be made by an independent person - usually
meaning an individual with no material conflicting interest with respect to the
subject matter -- adds some element of assurance that the judgment reflects a
bona fide effort to serve the interests that are supposed to be served by the
process of which the judgment is a part. In theory our interest in the independent
character of a decision maker is really concerned with his or her true mental state
or attitude when the decision is weighed and made; on what we might call
subjective independence of the decision maker. By mental state or attitude I refer
to the characteristics of internal fortitude and independence of view that will lead
to an evaluation and judgment unaffected by any irrelevant or inappropriate
considerations. An extraordinary person may have this characteristic even when
required to decide matters affecting his own important interests. But we cannot
directly observe this characteristic of unusual integrity and may easily disagree

whether it is present in a particular case.
We design legal systems not with extraordinary persons in mind, but for people
with average moral character and diligence and we try to build them in a way in
which observable features of the world are employed rather than unobservable
ones. We can do this only partially and imperfectly. Subjective states - intention -is too important a part of our moral reasoning to be wholly eliminated. But in
building a system to govern individuals of average moral character we assume
that subjective independence - independence of judgment - will occur more
frequently among persons who have no objective circumstances that would or
might affect the judgment of an ordinary person. Thus in seeing if independence
of mind is present we tend to use and I believe should use the objective criterion
as the first and most essential criterion of independence.
The statutes of the United States require that every issuer of securities traded
over an exchange or on NASDAQ periodically file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission financial statements that bear the attestation of an
independent auditor. Thus each issuer of such securities bears a legal duty to
employ an independent auditor. Overseeing that that obligation is met is, I
suggest, one of the core functions of the audit committee. Since with respect to
its own retention the audit firm itself has a conflicting interest, it should certainly
be insufficient for the audit committee, in making a determination of auditor
independence to rely only upon the conclusion of the auditor itself that it is
independent. The auditor's conclusion respecting its independence should I think
be regarded as a necessary but insufficient basis for the conclusion that the
auditor is in fact independent.
Conscientious corporate directors need three things to assist them to make such
a determination. First they need to understand that good corporate practice
strongly recommends that they undertake to make a judgment concerning the
independence of the auditors who audit the corporation's books and financial
statements. In other words they need to understand the nature and scope of their
duty. Second the audit committee needs relevant information bearing upon all of
the relations that the audit firm and its affiliates have with the corporation and its
affiliates and officers. Third the board must have some operating definition of
independence. When these three factors are present, and the audit committee
takes an active part in evaluating auditor independence we can expect a series of
safeguards to link. Investors can be offered the additional assurance that
independent directors have closely inspected objective threats to auditor integrity.
This is valuable to the capital markets because directors have fewer incentive
based compensation motivations than do corporate officers to approve
"aggressive" accounting and they have stronger litigation based disincentives to
do so. Few investors or analysts will have the ability (or the economic incentive)
to perform an informed review of the independence of the corporation's auditor
and under the current regulatory regime they have little information to do so, even
if they wanted to do so. The audit committee can perform an important function
here.
Consideration of the first of three prerequisites for the committee to perform this
function --- recognition of duty to do so --- falls, I believe, within the charge of this
committee. I hope you will give active consideration to including within any
statement, model, recommendation or standard you may issue a statement of the
audit committee's responsibility to reach a conclusion respecting auditor

independence.
The ISB can and I think will shortly act with respect to the second prerequisite of
board action: the furnishing of information to the audit committee bearing on
auditor independence. The ISB has recently proposed for public comment a
standard which if adopted will require an auditor to furnish to the audit committee
information disclosing the nature and scope of all of its activities and those of its
affiliates that may reasonably be thought to affect a reasonable person's
judgment respecting its independence.
Thirdly, the audit committee must have a concept of independence in mind when
it considers whether an auditor satisfies the statutory requirement that it is
independent. A serious drawback of the current regulation of auditor
independence is that over the decades it has grown into a complex body of prior
rulings addressing specific fact patterns. The field has become a highly technical
specialty requiring expertise and nevertheless it often eludes certainty. Large
accounting firms have developed specialists in this learning. The technicality of
this learning has had the perverse effect of disabling informed conscientious
businessmen and women from making judgments concerning auditor
independence on the same basis and with the confidence they might make such
judgments concerning other professionals. Instead auditor independence has for
the most part been relegated to auditors themselves to certify to the corporation
their own independence. Busy board members no doubt have been quite willing
to accept this practice. But recognition of the evident fact that the auditor itself is
in a conflict of interest situation with respect to this judgment makes any such
complete reliance suspect as a matter of fiduciary duty. Especially now when new
threats to auditor independence are thought by some, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, to be evolving in the marketplace, existing practice is
too frail a support for continuation of board delegation of independence
determinations to others. The board itself must make an informed judgment on
this subject.
The Independence Standards Board was formed to try to address the
dysfunctional complexity of current independence regulation in auditing. The
board will if it succeeds bring some clarity to a presently complex field. In the
interim it should be sufficient for conscientious audit committees to rely upon the
technical opinion of their audit firm for the limited purpose of assuring the
auditor's compliance with technical rules or precedents of independence. This
opinion should be regarded as a necessary but insufficient basis for the audit
committee's own judgment. This judgment, particularly in the absence of contrary
authoritative guidance from the SEC, the ISB or other authoritative body, is of the
same type as that which any rational, informed decision maker would make in
similar circumstances. That is, the board might ask whether, in light of all of the
relevant known facts, the judgment of a reasonable person in the situation of the
audit firm or any of its partners or employees with significant responsibility with
respect to the audit, might reasonably be thought to be subject to a material risk
that its or his or her judgment might be affected by an interest other than interests
shared by the users of the firm's audited financial statements.
For the audit committee to ask that question in addition to its questions
concerning auditor competence, integrity and service and then pass an informed
judgment on it will, in my opinion, contribute positively to the market perception of
the integrity of the corporation's accounting and reporting practices and the
integrity of its financial statements. This contribution will not benefit the costs of
capital of the firm but when generalized will enhance the efficiency of our vital

capital markets.
Thank you for the opportunity to share my thoughts on one aspect of your topic.
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